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TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNET JURISDICTION 
JOEL R. REIDENBERG† 
The current Internet technology creates ambiguity for sovereign 
territory because network boundaries intersect and transcend national 
borders.  At one level, this technologically-created ambiguity chal-
lenges sovereign jurisdiction.  Yet, the evolution of the Internet’s 
technological infrastructure is intertwined with sovereign jurisdiction 
because the relationship between technology and law is dynamic.1  As 
sovereign states grapple with the challenges of existing technologies, 
they still must protect their citizens in the online environment. 
The debates over Internet jurisdiction,2 however, mask deep and 
fundamental objections to state authority.  Jurisdiction fits within a 
broader struggle over the respect for the rule of law in the Informa-
tion Society.  In effect, jurisdiction over activities on the Internet has 
become one of the main battlegrounds for the struggle to establish 
the rule of law in the Information Society.3 
 
 † © 2005, Joel R. Reidenberg.  Professor of Law, Fordham University School of 
Law.  A.B. Dartmouth, J.D. Columbia, Ph.D Université de Paris I-Sorbonne.  The au-
thor would like to thank participants at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
Symposium, “Current Debates in the Conflict of Laws,” for their thoughtful comments 
on these reflections and would also like to thank Lodewijk Asscher, Lee Bygrave, Julie 
Cohen, Michael Froomkin, Sir Marrack Goulding, Bernt Hugenholtz, Mark Lemley, 
Kalypso Nicholaides, and Peter Swire for their vigorous debate and comments on the 
points relating to state enforcement powers. 
1 See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica:  The Formulation of Information Policy 
Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554-55 (1998) (describing the regulatory 
role of “[t]echnological capabilities and system design choices”); R. Polk Wagner, On 
Software Regulation, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 457 (2005) (arguing for a symbiotic relationship 
between code and law in Internet regulation). 
2 See Michael Geist, Cyberlaw 2.0, 44 B.C. L. REV. 323, 332-35 (2003) (describing the 
increasingly “bordered” nature of the Internet); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanar-
chy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1200 (1998) (challenging the notion that regulation is not 
applicable to the Internet); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise 
of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996) (arguing that “[c]yberspace 
requires a system of rules quite distinct from the laws that regulate physical, geo-
graphically-defined territories”); Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 
42 JURIMETRICS J. 261, 261 (2002) (arguing that “the policy rules embedded in the 
technical infrastructure must recognize values adopted by different statutes”). 
3 Dan Hunter makes an interesting critique of the open source movement that 
suggests a similar political battle for the control of intellectual property rights.  See Dan 
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Parts of the Internet community have long sought to divorce the 
applicability of sovereign law from their online activities.4  While the 
days of Internet separatism have waned, many technology players con-
tinue to advocate in favor of legal immunity for online activities.  Ya-
hoo! exemplifies this view.  As a proponent of technological immu-
nity, Yahoo! believes that democratically chosen laws should not apply 
to its online activities.  In the now famous French case, the U.S. com-
pany transmitted images of Nazi objects that were constitutionally pro-
tected in the United States, but illegal to display in France where the 
users were located and where Yahoo! targeted advertising.5  Yahoo! 
unsuccessfully argued that France did not have personal jurisdiction 
over the U.S. company because it was operating on the Internet from 
the United States and that French law did not apply to the images be-
cause they were stored on a server in the United States.6  Yahoo! also 
argued that the technology offered it no means to comply with French 
law.7  When the French courts rejected the technology-based defenses 
and ruled against Yahoo!, the company went forum shopping and 
sought to deny enforcement of the French order by suing for a de-
claratory judgment in federal court in California.8  In essence, the U.S. 
Internet company wanted to avoid the application and enforcement 
of a law it did not like in a country where it did business over the 
Internet.  Although Yahoo! found a willing accomplice at the U.S. dis-
trict court in the company’s effort to obtain immunity from financial 
liability, the U.S. court of appeals overturned the lower court decision 
and held that the California court had no personal jurisdiction over 
the French parties and that France had every right to hold Yahoo! ac-
countable in France.9 
 
Hunter, Culture War (Aug. 10, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=586463). 
4 See, e.g., Johnson & Post, supra note 2; John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996), at http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/ 
Declaration-Final.html. 
5 T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/ 
tgiparis20001120.pdf (last accessed May 2, 2005). 
6 Id. at 3. 
7 Id. 
8 Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 
1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
9 Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 1120, 
1126 (9th Cir. 2004).  The Ninth Circuit has just agreed to rehear this appeal en banc.  
Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th 
Cir. 2005). 
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This Essay argues that the initial wave of cases seeking to deny ju-
risdiction, choice of law, and enforcement to states where users and 
victims are located constitutes a type of “denial-of-service” attack 
against the legal system.  Internet separatists use technology-based ar-
guments to deny the existence of sufficient contacts for jurisdiction 
and the applicability of rules of law interdicting certain behavior.  
From this perspective, the attackers seek to disable states from protect-
ing their citizens online. 
The Essay next shows that innovations in information technology 
will undermine the technological assault on state jurisdiction.  This 
counterintuitive effect is born out of the fact that more sophisticated 
computing enlists the processing capabilities and power of users’ 
computers.  This interactivity gives the victim’s state a greater nexus 
with offending acts and provides a direct relationship with the of-
fender for purposes of personal jurisdiction and choice of law.  Some 
of these same innovations also enable states to enforce their decisions 
electronically and consequently bypass the problems of foreign rec-
ognition and enforcement of judgments. 
Finally, the Essay argues that the exercise of state power through 
assertions of jurisdiction can and should be used to advance the de-
velopment of more granular technologies and new service markets for 
legal compliance.  Technologies should be available to enable Inter-
net participants to respect the rule of law in states where their Inter-
net activities reach.  Assertions of state jurisdiction and electronic en-
forcement are likely to advance this public policy. 
I.  THE TECHNOLOGICAL DENIAL OF LAW:   
A DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACK 
Internet enthusiasts embrace the wonder of the Internet’s global 
electronic reach, but often reject the burden and responsibility of a 
global presence.  The defenses for hate,10 lies,11 drugs,12 sex,13 gam-
 
10 See T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, at 4 (finding that Yahoo! could not avoid the 
French ban on the display of Nazi symbols in France when Yahoo! served content to 
France). 
11 See Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.) (holding that a 
party cannot avoid prosecution for defamation via the Internet in the jurisdiction 
where the material was downloaded), available at http://www.4law.co.il/582.htm; Blu-
menthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 48-53 (D.D.C. 1998) (accepting an assertion of 
immunity by a service provider for online defamation based on infrastructure ar-
rangement); English Sports Betting v. Tostigan, 2002 WL 461592 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 
2002) (holding that Internet publication allegedly defaming Pennsylvania owner of off-
shore gambling website was insufficient to justify jurisdiction in Pennsylvania). 
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bling,14 and stolen music15 are in essence that technology justifies the 
denial of personal jurisdiction, the rejection of an assertion of appli-
cable law by a sovereign state, and the denial of the enforcement of 
decisions.  As Internet technologies enable global activities from re-
mote locations, these claims rely on the technical infrastructure 
choices that parties make to conduct their online activities and on the 
assumption that existing technologies are static.  In the face of these 
claims, legal systems engage in a rather conventional struggle to adapt 
existing regulatory standards to new technologies and the Internet.16  
Yet, the underlying fight is a profound struggle against the very right 
of sovereign states to establish rules for online activity. 
A.  Personal Jurisdiction 
Some of the earliest attempts to reject state authority relate to per-
sonal jurisdiction.  In the United States, courts have had great trouble 
figuring out how to apply traditional jurisdiction principles to Internet 
activities.  To satisfy the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution,17 
a defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum 
“such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice.’”18  The Supreme Court, in 
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, was more exacting, and lim-
 
12 See United States v. Yates, 391 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that criminal 
liability applies to the sale of prescription drugs over the Internet). 
13 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (basing the decision to invalidate portions 
of the Communications Decency Act, in part, on the quality of existing filtering tech-
nology); Voyeur Dorm, L.C. v. City of Tampa, 265 F.3d 1232, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(finding that local zoning law was not violated because adult shows were “provided” 
online from the local venue, and were not “consumed” in person at the local site). 
14 See People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 851 (Sup. Ct. 
1999) (holding that an offshore Internet site does not avoid New York gambling inter-
diction). 
15 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 
2004) (refusing to find distributors of software that enabled users to exchange digital 
media liable for copyright infringement), cert. granted 125 S. Ct. 686; In re Aimster 
Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 648-56 (7th Cir. 2003) (determining that a file-sharing 
provider could not avoid an injunction); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 
1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002) (same). 
16 Andreas Manolopoulos, Raising Cyberborders:  The Interaction Between Law and 
Technology, 11 INT’L J.L. & TECH. 40, 55 (2003) (noting that changing technological 
standards confound legal texts). 
17 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
18 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984); 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
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ited personal jurisdiction to cases in which the defendant “purposely 
avail[s]” himself of the forum.19  In essence, as the Supreme Court also 
held in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, personal jurisdiction is sub-
ject to a test of reasonableness.20  Similar standards exist in foreign 
states where a court’s competence to hear the case depends on the de-
fendant’s nexus with the forum state.21  For example, the Brussels and 
Lugano Conventions on jurisdiction for intra-European disputes look 
to various forms of contact between defendants and the state asserting 
jurisdiction.22 
In the Internet context, defendants have generally claimed that a 
remote forum is precluded from jurisdiction because the contacts are 
only established through a server that is not within the forum.  Defen-
dants assert that their activities are not directed at the forum state.23  
This type of argument challenges the very ability of sovereign states to 
protect their citizens within their borders from online threats.  Among 
the early U.S. cases, the Western District of Pennsylvania in Zippo 
Manufacturing v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. distinguished between active and 
passive web sites and held that remote, passive web sites did not ac-
cord personal jurisdiction to the forum.24  More recently, courts have 
looked to online targeting and to deleterious effects within the forum 
to determine if personal jurisdiction is appropriate.25  The effects ap-
 
19 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). 
20 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (holding that a defendant needs to have “conduct and 
connection with the forum State . . . such that he should reasonably anticipate being 
haled into court there”). 
21 For example, the French requirement is discussed in YVES LOUSSOURAN & PI-
ERRE BOUREL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ (6th ed. 1999). 
22 See Convention 88/592/EEC on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, 10-11 (Lugano Convention); 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, 1978 O.J. (L 304) 77, 79-80 (Brussels Convention). 
23 See Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that 
posting to a listserv is too passive for personal jurisdiction); Machulsky v. Hall, 210 F. 
Supp. 2d 531 (D.N.J. 2000) (finding that a buyer’s single transaction on eBay did not 
confer specific jurisdiction on the seller’s forum state). 
24 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
25 Geist, supra note 2, at 332-47; see also Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 
F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that an interactive web site with advertising 
targeted at Californians and with relationships with California vendors and customers 
creates sufficient contacts for general jurisdiction), reh’g en banc granted, 366 F.3d 789 
(9th Cir. 2004); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that information transmitted into the jurisdiction over the Inter-
net that causes harm within the jurisdiction provides minimum contacts); Panavision 
Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding jurisdiction where 
a domain name was registered to divert Internet traffic away from the forum); Cy-
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proach is also gaining currency outside the United States.  In Dow 
Jones & Co. v. Gutnick,26 the High Court of Australia subjected Dow 
Jones to suit in Australia for defamation in that country under Austra-
lian law arising from a web posting on a U.S.-based server.27  Likewise, 
the High Court of Justice in the United Kingdom found that Gover-
nor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s campaign manager could be sued for 
defamation in the British courts as the result of statements about a 
U.K. resident that appeared on a newspaper website in the United 
States.28 
The maturation of the analysis reflects an evolution from a some-
what naïve view of the Internet to a rejection of the Internet activists’ 
simple denial of law.  The Internet became popular precisely because 
of the promise of a global audience.  But, this promise could not ab-
solve online activities of legal responsibility.  While online technolo-
gies were initially designed for geographically indifferent access, noth-
ing fixed the technology in stone.  Commercial pressures and the 
dynamic nature of the Internet have resulted in geolocation and the 
re-creation of geographic origin and destination.29  This design fea-
ture and its malleability mean that Internet activity is “purposely avail-
ing” throughout the Internet whenever content is posted without ge-
olocation filtering.  In gravitating toward an effects doctrine, 
sovereign states promoted submission to the rule of law rather than 
capitulation to an Internet attack. 
B.  Choice of Law 
The next type of attack against sovereign authority seeks to deny 
the applicability of the substantive law if it is not the law of the place 
 
bersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419-20 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding a passive 
home page insufficient to establish jurisdiction); Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (setting 
out the test for passive jurisdiction); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp 
295, 301 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (determining that there is no personal jurisdiction when web 
site is passive). 
26 (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 [Austl.], available at http://www.4law.co.il/582.htm. 
27 Id. at 263-64; see also Ari Weinberg, Australia to Dow Jones:  Stay Awhile, 
FORBES.COM, Dec. 10, 2002, at http://www.forbes.com/2002/12/10/cx_aw_1210 
dowjones.html. 
28 Richardson v. Schwarzenegger, 2004 EWHC 2422 (Q.B. Oct. 29, 2004), available 
at http://portal.nasstar.com/75/files/Richardson-v-Schwarzenegger%20QBD%2029% 
20Oct%202004.pdf. 
29 See, e.g., Akamai:  How it Works, at  http://www.akamai.com/en/html 
/services/edge_how_it_works.html (“EdgeScape enables the enterprise to customize 
content based on the following data: . . . Country . . . City . . . Latitude and Longi-
tude . . . Time zone”). 
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where the Internet activity was launched, such as the place where the 
server is located.  This blanket denial of prescriptive jurisdiction un-
dermines the basic objective of conflict of laws jurisprudence, which is 
to avoid forum shopping and promote an efficient resolution of dis-
putes when cases have international dimensions.  Network technology 
pushes the localization of activities for choice-of-law purposes toward 
the transmission end-points.  However, the attack against the law 
where users are located encourages forum shopping, to locate the in-
frastructure for the conduct of Internet activities within legal safe ha-
vens.30 
Sovereign authority, nevertheless, asserts itself against Internet ac-
tivists.  In Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCrave TV, a film studio 
fought successfully to apply U.S. copyright law to streaming video on 
the Internet and obtained an injunction against a Canadian service 
that could legally stream video in Canada from servers in Canada.31  In 
France, the Yahoo! court determined that the French penal code ap-
plied to Yahoo!’s activities because the illegal content could be visual-
ized in France.32  The United Kingdom recently followed the same ap-
proach in a libel case, finding the place of downloading dispositive for 
the choice of law.33  For privacy, the Children’s Online Privacy Protec-
tion Act34 in the United States contains a choice of law provision in its 
definitions that applies the protections of the American statute to any 
website, regardless of its place of origin, that collects personal infor-
mation from children.35  The European Directive on data privacy con-
tains a similarly expansive choice of law rule that purports to apply 
European substantive law to any organization that uses means within 
the European Union to collect personal data.36 
 
30 See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in 
BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE 129, 142 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997) (arguing 
that Internet actors will locate in safe havens). 
31 Nos. Civ.A. 00-121, Civ.A. 00-120, 2000 WL 255989, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 
2000). 
32 T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/ 
tgiparis20001120.pdf. 
33 Lewis v. King, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1329 (Eng. C.A.), available at http:// 
www.courtservice.gov.uk/judgmentsfiles/j2844/lewis-v-king.htm. 
34 Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506). 
35 15 U.S.C. § 6501(2) (2000). 
36 See Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Indi-
viduals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data, art. 4, § 1(c), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 39; JOEL R. REIDENBERG & PAUL M. 
SCHWARTZ, DATA PROTECTION LAW AND ON-LINE SERVICES:  REGULATORY RESPONSES 
126-28 (1998), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/ 
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The attempt by Internet separatists to deny the application of lo-
cal law creates a stark challenge to public order rules.  Online hate 
speech, for example, is generally prohibited outside the United 
States.37  However, the First Amendment provides constitutional pro-
tection38 and may therefore make the United States a haven for those 
wishing to spread such hate speech on the Internet.  Similar issues are 
raised by the recognition that Internet pornography receives constitu-
tional protection within the United States39 and data privacy is a fun-
damental political right outside the U.S.40  These legal differences en-
courage participants in illicit activities to launch their Internet 
activities from states that provide a legal safe haven.41 
C.  Enforcement of Judgments 
The recognition of foreign judgments in these attack cases will of-
ten be problematic.  As the Yahoo! case illustrated, public order rules 
at the place where Internet activity is launched may conflict with those 
of the place where the activity has its effects.  Even the international 
conventions on recognition of foreign judgments provide an excep-
tion to enforcement when there is a conflict with the public order of 
the enforcing state.42 
 
docs/studies/regul_en.pdf. 
37 See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 312 U.N.T.S. 221 (subjecting the right to free-
dom of expression to restrictions necessary in a democratic society); T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 
20, 2000, at 4(“[L]a simple visualisation en France de tels objets [nazis] constitue une 
violation de l’article R.645-1 du Code penal.”), available at http://www.juriscom.net/ 
txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20001120.pdf; see also T.G.I. Paris, Feb. 11, 2003, at http:// 
www.legalis.net/jurisprudence-decision.php3?id_article=1043 (applying the French 
hate speech law, but determining that Yahoo! and its chief executive Timothy Koogle 
had satisfied their obligations under a separate telecommunications safe harbor provi-
sion). 
38 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (invalidating a city 
ordinance which criminalized cross-burning and offensive graffiti). 
39 See U.S. CONST., amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the free-
dom of speech . . . .”); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects indecent sexual material on the internet). 
40 See Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 36 (protecting the right to privacy 
with respect to the processing of personal data); Council of Europe (COE), Conven-
tion for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data, Jan. 28, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 317 (1981) (establishing the fundamental right to data 
protection). 
41 See Froomkin, supra note 30, at 142 (arguing that the Internet encourages rout-
ing around restrictive laws). 
42 See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing intra-European enforce-
ment conflicts). 
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Courts are also especially ill-equipped to evaluate the nuances of 
foreign public order decisions.  The Yahoo! case illustrates this diffi-
culty particularly well.  At the district court level, Yahoo! introduced a 
misleading translation of the French decision.43  The key passage of 
the order in the French version was translated word-for-word with the 
exception of a qualifying phrase.  This qualifying phrase was simply 
omitted in the English translation.  The original court decision or-
dered Yahoo!: “de prendre toutes les mesures de nature à dissuader et 
à rendre impossible toute consultation sur Yahoo.com du service de 
ventes aux enchères d’objets nazis.”44  This was translated as “to take 
all necessary measures to dissuade and render impossible any access via 
Yahoo.com to the Nazi artifact auction service . . . .”45  Instead of 
properly translating mesures de nature as either “available measures” or 
“the type of measures,” the translation for the U.S. court ignored “de 
nature” and added the word “necessary,” a term that does not appear at 
all in the original language.  The effect of this distorted translation is 
to convert the filtering obligation from one of good faith efforts that is 
found in the original to one of successful results in the translation.  At 
the same time, the translation distorted the term “Nazi objects” by 
translating it as “Nazi artifacts.”  This distortion creates an implication 
not found in the original text that the items had historical value.  
Such distortions in translation can serve to increase the sense of con-
flict over public order values.  Indeed, the display of Nazi artifacts with 
historical connotations is expressly permitted by the French law.46 
 
43 The translation of the French opinion was prepared for the U.S. court by one of 
the French attorneys representing Yahoo!’s French subsidiary in the French proceed-
ing.  Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 
1181, 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“translation attested accurate by Isabelle Camus, Febru-
ary 16, 2001”), rev’d 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc granted 399 F.3d 1010 
(9th Cir. 2005). 
44 T.G.I. Paris, May 22, 2000 (emphasis added), at http://www.legalis.net/ 
jurisprudence-decision.php3?id_article=175.  Note that this language comes from the 
original interim order that Yahoo! translated.  This exact language was then repeated 
by the French court in the confirmation of the interim order.  See T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 
2000, at 2, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20001120.pdf.  
The U.S. proceeding challenged the enforceability of the confirming order, but Ya-
hoo! used the earlier translation in the U.S. proceeding. 
45 Yahoo!, Inc., 169 F. Supp. at 1185 (emphasis added). 
46 The relevant provision of the Code Pénal prohibits: 
The act, except for the needs of a film, performance or exhibit that has an 
historical connotation, the wearing or display or exhibit in public of a uni-
form, insignia, or sign resembling the uniforms, insignias, or signs that were 
worn or exhibited either by members of an organization declared criminal by 
application of Article 9 of the Statutes of the International Military Tribunal 
annexed to the Treaty of London of August 8, 1945, or by a person found 
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Since states are understandably concerned with playing a role in 
regulating illicit Internet activity, they are unlikely to remain passive 
when those activities conflict with public order rules.  Faced with en-
forcement difficulties at the primary source, state authorities will look 
to second-order means for the enforcement of public policies.  Online 
intermediaries are at the front lines.47 In the New York gambling case 
People v. World Interactive Gaming, for example, the state succeeded in 
obtaining a conviction against an offshore Internet casino,48 though 
this victory did not appear to stem the flow of illegal Internet gam-
bling in New York.  Consequently, the state sought to prevent Internet 
gambling by striking at the payment system.49 
II.  THE TECHNOLOGICAL EMPOWERMENT  
OF STATES:  INNOVATION 
Ironically, just as the Internet attack uses technological infrastruc-
ture to challenge jurisdiction, technological innovation also empowers 
sovereign states to assert their rules on Internet activity.  The evolu-
tion of sophisticated information processing and information tech-
nologies provides states with greater contacts that justify personal ju-
risdiction and a stronger claim to prescriptive jurisdiction.  At the 
same time, these technologies offer states important means to enforce 
their decisions. 
 
guilty by a French or international court of one or more crimes against hu-
manity as found in Articles 211-1 to 212-3 or specified by Law No. 64-1326 of 
December 26, 1964. 
CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN], art. R.645-1, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ 
WAspad/RechercheSimpleCode?commun=CPENAL&code=r645-1. 
47 See Associated Press, Paypal To Impose Fines for Breaking Porn, Gambling, Drug Bans 
(Sept. 13, 2004), at http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/9654085.htm 
(discussing PayPal’s decision to fine users who violate the site’s terms of service to pay 
for gambling, pornography or pharmaceuticals from non-certified online pharmacies). 
48 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 848-50 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (holding that New York State had ju-
risdiction over an offshore company offering internet gambling to residents of New 
York). 
49 Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General, Ten Banks End On-
line Gambling with Credit Cards (Feb. 11, 2003), at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/ 
press/2003/feb/feb11b_03.html (announcing the success of Eliot Spitzer’s initiative to 
obtain agreements from banks to block cardholders from using their cards for online 
gambling). 
  
2005] TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNET JURISDICTION 1961 
A.  Personal Jurisdiction 
At present, the Internet relies on a technical design concept 
called “end-to-end.”50  This means that the infrastructure operates 
merely to transmit information from one point to another and any 
sophisticated processing takes place at the end point.  The transmis-
sion protocols of the Internet were also designed to be geographically 
independent.  But, users and technologies exist within physical bor-
ders and these end points provide justification and capability for sov-
ereign states to assert their authority. 
The increasing reliance on end-point processing for sophisticated 
Internet uses such as multimedia services creates significant interactiv-
ity behind the scenes.  For example, streaming video purposefully 
avails itself of the user’s computing capability at the user’s location.  
The sophistication of the technology denies the attack against jurisdic-
tion suggested by some Internet separatists precisely because the 
technical infrastructure depends on interactivity.  In Media3 Technolo-
gies, LLC v. Mail Abuse Prevention System, LLC, Mail Abuse Prevention 
System (MAPS) created a blacklist of servers that proliferated spam 
and allowed Internet participants to query the blacklist stored on a 
server in California.51  The Massachusetts court found that the avail-
ability and query action sufficed for personal jurisdiction in Massachu-
setts.52  Similarly, the ubiquitous use of JavaScript, pop-up windows, 
and fetch commands each enlist resources where the user is located 
by creating an interaction between a remote web service and the 
processing resources of the user’s computer.  These interactions tar-
get users at the users’ locations. 
The most telling example comes from filtering.  Web sites and 
Internet service providers often design or filter content based on user 
location.  RealNetworks, for instance, only streams soccer games to 
users in particular countries, and some web sites display prices in cur-
rencies matched to the user’s location.53  Similarly, Yahoo! offered 
banner advertisements in French to visitors to a California web site 
screened as originating in France.  Verizon, on the other hand, re-
 
50 See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:  Preserving the Ar-
chitecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 930-31 (2001) (dis-
cussing the end-to-end infrastructure). 
51 No. 00-CV-12524-MEL, 2001 WL 92389, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 02, 2001). 
52 Id. at *4-5. 
53 Associated Press, Geolocation:  Don’t Fence Web In, WIRED NEWS (July 12, 2004), at 
http://www.wired.com/news/infostructure/0,1377,64178,00.html (describing tech-
nology that allows websites to tailor content based on the location of access). 
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fused to accept all email originating in Europe in an effort to combat 
spam.54  This geolocation of users demonstrates that Internet partici-
pants actively target the user’s jurisdiction or, as Verizon did, refrain 
from interacting with users located in particular places. 
The result of the technological innovations that make the Internet 
experience seamless for users is that sovereign states are presented 
with a stronger basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction.  The 
technological attack against jurisdiction cannot be justified where in-
formation processing resources within the sovereign state are enlisted 
by remote Internet participants and where sophisticated Internet par-
ticipants can, if they desire, avoid the global scope of their online ac-
tivities.  In effect, the technological choice either to filter or not to fil-
ter becomes a normative decision to “purposefully avail” of the user’s 
forum state.  Technological innovation that enhances interactivity also 
shifts the burden from demonstrating that a jurisdiction was targeted 
to showing that reasonable efforts were made to avoid contact with the 
jurisdiction. 
B.  Choice of Law 
Technological innovation also supports sovereign states in the 
claim for prescriptive jurisdiction and the application of their laws to 
online activity.  An infrastructure that takes advantage of facilities or 
processing capabilities in a state implicates that state’s interests.  The 
technical attack that seeks a global benefit from Internet activity with-
out the global burden of responsibility does not. 
The European directive on data privacy illustrates this effect.  The 
choice of law provision declares that: 
Each Member State shall apply the national provisions it adopts pursuant 
to this Directive to the processing of personal data where: . . . (c) the 
controller is not established on Community territory and, for purposes 
of processing personal data makes use of equipment, automated or oth-
erwise, situated on the territory of the said Member State, unless such 
equipment is used only for purposes of transit through the territory of 
the Community.
55
 
 
54 John Leyden, Verizon Persists With European Email Blockade, REGISTER (Jan. 14, 
2004), at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/01/14/verizon_email_block/. 
55 Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 4(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 39, available at  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_ 
part1_en.pdf. 
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While the official versions in other languages seem to impose a lesser 
standard based on the use of “means” within the member state,56 the 
consequences of technical innovations that rely on the power of a 
user’s computer to process data appear to justify the application of the 
law of the user’s member state.57 
In the American context, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Pro-
tection Act58 provides for an in rem action against a domain name 
even when a U.S. trademark holder asserts a claim against foreign acts 
by a foreign party.  The basis for this assertion of U.S. law is the tech-
nical infrastructure that places the registry of domain names in the 
United States.59 
As technology increases the points of involvement or attachment 
in various countries and at the user’s location, each of these countries 
and the user’s state has a greater interest in the Internet activity and a 
greater interest in applying its substantive law to that activity. 
C.  Technological Enforcement 
Technological innovations also mean that states can impose liabil-
ity on those who do not comply with local rules.  Technology empow-
ers sovereign states with very potent electronic tools to enforce their 
policies and decisions even in the absence of a wrongdoer’s physical 
presence or tangible assets.60  States can use filters and packet inter-
ceptors as well as hacker tools like viruses and worms to enforce deci-
sions and sanction malfeasance.  These electronic tools might estab-
lish electronic borders that prevent offending material and foreign 
 
56 The English and French versions do not use the same terminology.  Compare id. 
(using the term “equipment” in the English version) with Council Directive 95/46/CE, 
art. 4(1)(c) (using the term “moyens,” or means, in the French version), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_ 
part1_fr.pdf. 
57 See Peter P. Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy:  International Choice of Law and 
the Internet, 32 INT’L LAW. 991, 999 (1998) (“Actual enforcement will thus take place 
under the law of a particular Member State.”). 
58 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 
Stat. 1501A-545 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 16, and 28 
U.S.C.). 
59 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2000) (providing for an in rem action by the 
owner of a mark against a domain name “in the judicial district in which the domain 
name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority that registered 
or assigned the domain name is located”). 
60 See Joel R. Reidenberg, States and Internet Enforcement, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 
213, 225-29 (2003) (addressing the enforcement of decisions through Internet instru-
ments). 
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wrongdoers from entering the state’s electronic zone, like the firewall 
established by China; electronic blockades that prevent offenders 
from transmitting outside the borders of the wrongdoer’s state; or 
electronic sanctions such as a denial-of-service attack to take down an 
offender’s site.61 
For democratic societies, adherence to the rule of law means that 
the use of any technological enforcement instrument necessitates 
carefully prescribed authorization criteria.  Each mechanism impli-
cates important civil, political, and sovereign rights.  As with other po-
lice powers of the state, legal authority is a prerequisite for the exer-
cise of coercive powers.  As a threshold matter, states must have a legal 
process in place that authorizes the use and choice of technological 
enforcement tools.  This is analogous to the ordinary civil procedure 
process that requires a winning party to return to court for a subse-
quent enforcement order if a violator refuses to comply with the ini-
tial judgment.  Like traditional enforcement instruments, the use of 
technological tools must be framed by constitutional and public policy 
limits as well as constraints of international norms. 
The basic principle guiding the choice to use a technological in-
strument or to deploy a specific type of instrument should be that a 
state only uses the least intrusive means to accomplish the rule en-
forcement.62  Four factors must be considered to determine whether 
and how to use technologies for rule enforcement.  First, a state must 
weigh the magnitude of any threat to public order.  If a threat is sig-
nificant, a state may be justified in taking more drastic measures such 
as an electronic blockade.  Second, the urgency of any threat must be 
considered.  If continuing rule violations pose imminent danger to a 
state’s public order, a state will have stronger justification to take seri-
ous measures such as electronic sanctions.  Third, a state must evalu-
ate the effectiveness of the tool.  If a tool will not be effective against 
the rule violation, then the collateral implications may outweigh any 
justificatory use.  Lastly, a state must consider the ultimate enforce-
ment goal.  If the state seeks the cessation of offending activity, the 
 
61 Id. 
62 The principle of “least restrictive means” appears in many areas of U.S. law, par-
ticularly in First Amendment cases, as well as in other legal systems.  See, e.g., Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (defining 
the approach for First Amendment analysis); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 
180, 217 (1997) (applying the approach to cable television rules); see also Alan O. 
Sykes, The Least Restrictive Means, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 403, 403-04 (2003) (discussing the 
approach in the context of the WTO). 
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technological enforcement tool may be different than if the goal is to 
compel a violator to pay monetary damages. 
The legal pre-conditions for the deployment of technological in-
struments must satisfy internal constitutional and public policy limits 
on the use of state power.  In the United States, the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that “[n]o person shall . . . be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,”63 and 
the Fourteenth Amendment applies the same standard to actions of 
the separate states.64  These limitations necessarily frame the use of 
technological instruments.  Just as due process protections apply to 
the arrest and incarceration of suspects and the seizure of property,65 a 
state cannot escape accountability by conducting an enforcement ac-
tion online.  Similar standards exist in the traditions of other democ-
racies.66  This means that prior to the deployment of technological in-
struments, the state must have an adjudicatory process to justify the 
use of the particular tool. 
Since the deployment of any of the technological instruments will 
not be perfect, a state’s constraints on enforcement error must also 
apply.  If, for example, the police search the wrong house by mistake 
or a search warrant is obviously defective, the victim of the error will 
often be entitled to redress and the law enforcement officer may be 
personally liable to the victim.67  The state should not be able to avoid 
the standards of liability for mistakes by deploying technological en-
forcement instruments.  However, the conventional acceptance of 
some error, such as mistakes made on a reasonable basis, should also 
apply to the deployment of technological instruments. 
Beyond mistakes, enforcement error may arise against third-party 
interests because each technological instrument has a risk of collateral 
harm or damage.  Electronic borders may over-block and prevent 
third parties’ licit activities from entering the state.  Electronic block-
 
63 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
64 See id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law”). 
65 See Denmore v. Hyung Joo Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003) (finding that due pro-
cess was satisfied for detention of alien pending removal hearing); U.S. CONST. amend 
V (setting forth, in the Takings Clause, due process requirements for the seizure of 
property). 
66 See Thomas M.J. Möllers, The Role of Law in European Integration, 48 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 679, 688-711 (2000) (discussing shared European legal principles). 
67 See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563-65 (2004) (holding that an officer 
who used a clearly invalid warrant to conduct a search was not entitled to qualified 
immunity). 
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ades may inadvertently capture non-wrongdoers and will, in any case, 
block access to the blockade target from third parties in states.  Elec-
tronic sanctions against a wrongdoer’s web server may also simultane-
ously destroy services for third parties such as email and Internet ac-
cess. 
When an electronic enforcement action prevents third parties 
from communicating, these types of errors confront basic constitu-
tional protections on free speech and communications.  In the United 
States, the powerful First Amendment jurisprudence will require the 
state to be able to justify any harm caused by the deployment of tech-
nological enforcement instruments under careful scrutiny.68  Similar 
principles, though not as expansive as the First Amendment, exist out-
side the United States.  For example, the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms estab-
lishes a right to receive information.69  Article 10(1) of the Convention 
defines freedom of expression to include the “freedom . . . to receive 
and impart information and ideas without interference by public au-
thority and regardless of frontiers.”70  This right is not absolute and 
may be circumscribed for a number of reasons, including “for main-
taining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”71  In effect, the 
protections for third parties’ freedom of speech and communication 
force the state to choose technological instruments that are narrowly 
tailored and that can be justified as essential to achieve the mandated 
enforcement objective. 
Lastly, to the extent that the state uses intermediaries as enforce-
ment agents, overreaching by such “deputized” private actors can vio-
late civil liberties and be imputed to the state.  Civil libertarians may 
also be concerned about the abuse of intermediaries by the state when 
intermediaries are pressed into law enforcement functions.  These ob-
jections, however, are not insurmountable obstacles.  The response 
lies in legislation that protects against overreaching and that protects 
against abuse of intermediaries. 
Public international law may constrain states’ use of electronic 
blockades and electronic sanctions.  To the extent that these instru-
ments are hostile acts, the U.N. Charter provides: 
 
68 Whether a court should apply a “strict scrutiny” or “intermediate scrutiny” test 
ought to depend on the type of speech that is harmed. 
69 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 1 Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
70 Id. art. 10(1). 
71 Id. art. 10(2). 
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All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations.
72
 
However, the deployment of electronic blockades and sanctions 
against identified wrongdoers hardly seems to be a “use of force” as 
currently contemplated by the U.N. Charter.73  The instruments do 
not attack the foreign state as such nor the foreign state’s infrastruc-
ture; they attack a wrongdoer located in the foreign state.  As noted by 
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 
“[a] state’s law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in 
the territory of another state only with the consent of the other state, 
given by duly authorized officials of that state.”74  However, no interna-
tional human rights convention clearly prohibits “forcible abduction 
or irregular extradition.”75 
Where electronic blockades and sanctions are the equivalent of 
seizure and incarceration, customary international law is at best unset-
tled and therefore not yet mature enough to limit the deployment of 
online enforcement tools.  Furthermore, the U.N. Charter’s right of 
self-defense is also conditioned on an “armed attack.”76  An online en-
forcement action, even a denial-of-service attack, against a specific pri-
vate wrongdoer seems very hard to qualify as an “armed attack.” 
 
72 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
73 See, e.g., Jason Barkham, Information Warfare and International Law on the Use of 
Force, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 57, 79 (2001) (noting that information warfare ap-
pears to be outside the traditional prohibitions on the use of force in international 
law); Christopher C. Joyner & Catherine Lotrionte, Information Warfare as International 
Coercion:  Elements of a Legal Framework, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 825, 834-39 (2001) (arguing 
that contemporary international law does not have clear restrictions on information 
warfare); Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International 
Law:  Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885 (1999) (ex-
pressing skepticism that even a state attack against another state’s network system 
would be within the U.N. Charter prohibition); Sean P. Kanuck, Recent Development, 
Information Warfare:  New Challenges for Public International Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 272 
(1996) (arguing that current international law will need to adapt rules to restrict in-
formation warfare). 
74 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 432(2) (1987). 
75 Id. § 432 reporter’s note 1. 
76 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
  
1968 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 1951 
The recent Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime77 may 
even provide an international legal obligation for states to use online 
enforcement tools.  The convention provides that signatories “shall 
adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to en-
sure that the criminal offences . . . are punishable by effective, propor-
tionate and dissuasive sanctions, which include deprivation of lib-
erty.”78  The official explanatory note indicates that the provision 
“leaves open the possibility of other sanctions or measures reflecting 
the seriousness of the offences . . . [and] leaves to the Parties the dis-
cretionary power to create a system of criminal offences and sanctions 
that is compatible with their existing national legal systems.”79 
International economic law, however, may impose limits on the 
use of an electronic border for enforcement purposes.  The Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization80 sets out substantive 
obligations for signatory states to allow cross-border services and in-
formation flows.  Antigua’s recent case against the United States, 
though, suggests that the WTO constraints will affect the legitimacy of 
the underlying rules rather than the choice of enforcement mecha-
nisms themselves.81  Antigua was a haven for Internet gambling opera-
tions that faced a substantial loss of business in the United States as a 
result of U.S. legislation outlawing non-U.S.-licensed operations.  An-
tigua filed a complaint with the WTO against the United States alleg-
ing that U.S. laws restricting Internet gambling were in violation of 
 
77 Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, Convention on Cybercrime, opened 
for signature Nov. 23, 2001, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-11 (2003), Europ. T.S. No. 185, 
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/185.doc. 
78 Id. art. 13 § 1. 
79 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, ¶ 
130 (Nov. 8, 2001), at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/185.htm. 
80 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf. 
81 See WTO Panel Report on U.S. Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004) (ruling on the substan-
tive issue of whether the United States can prohibit offshore gambling), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/285R-00.doc. The U.S. has 
appealed the ruling to the WTO Appellate Body.  See United States Trade Representa-
tive, Statement from USTR Spokesman Richard Mills Regarding the WTO Gambling 
Dispute with Antigua and Barbuda, Nov. 10, 2004 (“We will vigorously appeal this 
deeply flawed report . . . .”), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/ 
Spokesperson_Statements/Statement_from_USTR_Spokesman_Richard_Mills_ 
Regarding_the_WTO_Gambling_dispute_with_Antigua_Barbuda.html; Matt Richtel, 
Trade Group Says U.S. Ban on Net Gambling Violates Global Law, N.Y. TIMES Mar. 26, 2004, 
at C5 (summarizing the case and noting the decision to appeal). 
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U.S. trade obligations relating to the cross-border supply of services.82  
The case is interesting because it addresses the legitimacy of the gam-
bling laws themselves and whether the WTO rules bar the substantive 
provisions of U.S. law.  If the final ruling in the case determines that 
U.S. substantive law contravenes the WTO obligations that the United 
States accepted, then any enforcement by the United States of the 
Internet gambling laws would not be a legitimate exercise of state 
power.  International economic law, thus, constrains the state’s under-
lying decisions on rules and policies rather than the choice of en-
forcement instruments if the decisions and policies are legitimate. 
III.  A PRESCRIPTIVE HIERARCHY FOR TECHNOLOGY:   
LEGAL SUPREMACY 
The Internet attack on state jurisdiction advocates an important 
technological determinism that is problematic for the relationship be-
tween law and technology.  In general, the advocates of denying state 
jurisdiction would effectively transfer rule-making power to technolo-
gists and technologies.  Sovereign states, however, have an obligation 
to protect their citizens and to assure that technologies empower rules 
of law rather than undermine the protection of citizens; states must be 
able to assure their citizens’ rights within their national territories.  As 
technology enables noxious behavior online, states need ways to pre-
vent and sanction Internet activities that violate their chosen rules of 
law.  This means that states cannot allow technological attacks to de-
feat their citizens’ politically chosen rights. 
In effect, the rule of law as expressed by sovereign states must be 
supreme over technological claims.  The rule of law must take prece-
dence over technological choices in establishing the boundaries that 
society imposes on noxious online behavior.  The supremacy of law, at 
the same time, must provide incentives for innovation and the devel-
opment of technologies that can support public policy choices made 
by states. 
A.  Prescribing Noxious Behavior 
The Internet attacks against sovereign jurisdiction arise most often 
when states face critical questions of public values and public order.  
 
82 WTO, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Antigua and Barbuda, 
WT/DS285/2 (June 13, 2003), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments 
/t/WT/DS/285-2.doc. 
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For example, many of the cases relate to the suppression of hate 
speech, defamation, pornography, gambling, and music thievery.83  
The technical community argues for its technical solutions rather 
than legal solutions.  However, technology alone cannot resolve the 
problems of harmful and wrongful conduct online.  In the absence of 
legal obligations, the development of technologies for public policy 
are typically stymied or rejected.  After substantial hype, the technical 
protocol designed to support privacy policies and international pri-
vacy laws, the Platform for Privacy Protection,84 failed to gain traction 
in the web community.85  PICS technology, designed as a non-
regulatory answer to the protection of children from Internet pornog-
raphy, more or less died after the U.S. Supreme Court struck down 
the Communications Decency Act.  Similarly, when technologies exist 
and are deployed for commercial purposes, they are typically not con-
figured to support public policies.  Yahoo!, for example, was already 
filtering French users to generate advertising revenue, but Yahoo! said 
it could not filter out those same users in order to comply with French 
law.86 
The exponential growth and prevalence of spam, computer 
worms, and viruses on the Internet illustrate the need for a legal re-
sponse.  These scourges exist through the exploitation of technologi-
cal innovations and inadequate responses by the technical commu-
nity.  In sovereign states, these noxious behaviors harm business, 
consumer, and citizen interests.  More significantly, these growing se-
curity threats jeopardize the very utility of the Internet for communi-
cations upon which citizens now rely.  As two-thirds of email traffic be-
comes spam,87 users respond by reducing their reliance on the 
Internet for communications. 
 
83 See supra notes 10-15. 
84 For the history of P3P and a description of the protocol, see LORRIE FAITH CRA-
NOR, WEB PRIVACY WITH P3P (2002). 
85 Few web sites code their web pages for use with P3P.  In addition, the protocol 
raises a number of important legal issues that pose obstacles to wide deployment.  See 
JOEL R. REIDENBERG & LORRIE CRANOR, CAN USER AGENTS ACCURATELY REPRESENT 
PRIVACY POLICIES? (TPRC 30th Research Conference Paper No. 65, 2002) (discussing 
legal concerns about privacy agreements, inadvertent deception, and liability related to 
the accuracy of P3P user agents), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=328860. 
86 T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, at 3, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr 
/cti/tgiparis20001120.pdf. 
87 See, e.g., John E. Dunn, Spam Growth Slowing at Last, TECHWORLD, Jan. 12, 2005, 
at http://www.techworld.com/security/news/index.cfm?NewsID=2922 (reporting that 
spam represents 67% of all mail). 
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To counteract noxious online behavior, Internet participants and 
states will each look to create safe zones on the Internet that are more 
secure where policy rules apply and are enforced.  Indeed, a wide-
open, insecure Internet cannot cope with security problems for the 
average user/citizen, nor will that infrastructure resolve societal de-
bates over hate, pornography, and other online vices. 
In contrast to the Internet as a whole, safe zones become jurisdic-
tional zones that are established through architectural designs.88  Vir-
tual private networks are an increasingly common example.  For a 
zone to be safe, users will need to be authenticated and their interac-
tions authorized by the network infrastructure.89  Safe zones will by 
necessity dictate permissible network activities at each entry point and 
end point of the zone.  These zones will consequently contain geo-
graphic indicators because wireless access, the new Internet address-
ing protocol known as Ipv6, and commercial pressure all require geo-
graphic localization.  These zones then form a focus for the 
establishment by states of the rule of law.  Participants will be located 
within the territory of states and will have contacts that can be local-
ized within national territories.  The design of the safe zones can give 
Internet participants the freedom of choice to select whether or not 
their activities give rise to contacts empowering states with personal 
jurisdiction and the application of local law.  Technological innova-
tion should create products and services to enable these participant 
choices. 
B.  The Normative Exercise of State Authority 
States have, as a result, a normative incentive to assert the su-
premacy of law over technological determinism.  As a baseline, the 
rule of law and public values must drive technical capabilities.  In-
deed, examples already exist for the supremacy of law over technol-
 
88 See Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech on the Internet:  A Legal and 
Technical Model, 98 MICH. L. REV. 395, 399-404 (1999) (discussing Internet access con-
trols); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, A Network Theory Approach to Internet Jurisdiction Through 
Data Privacy, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 493, 494 (2004) (arguing for a “trusted systems” ap-
proach to jurisdiction). 
89 See, e.g., Ross Anderson, ‘Trusted Computing’ Frequently Asked Questions, Ver. 1.1 
(Aug. 2003) (discussing innovations in access controls), at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ 
users/rja14/tcpa-faq.html; CRAIG MUNDIE ET AL., TRUSTWORTHY PAPER 8 (Microsoft 
White Paper, Oct. 2002), at http://download.microsoft.com/download/a/f/2/ 
af22fd56-7f19-47a-8167-4b1d73cd3c57/twc_mundie.doc (“Assertions of identity (that 
is, authentication) need to be robust, so that taking actions that depend on identity 
(that is, authorization) can be done reliably.”). 
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ogy.  In the United States, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act pro-
hibits the sale and manufacture of devices that circumvent techno-
logical protections on digital works.90  The Communications Assis-
tance for Law Enforcement Act requires a wiretap-ready capability for 
new digital telecommunications infrastructure.91  Outside the United 
States, other governments have experimented with a similar approach.  
The French Law for Trust in the Digital Economy requires service 
providers to inform their clients of the availability of filtering tech-
nologies and to include features enabling clients to report illicit con-
tent.92  The 1997 German Teleservices Data Protection Act even had a 
rule that required special alerts for the use of “cookies” technology.93 
By using public values to drive technical rules, the exercise of state 
jurisdiction promotes the development of more granular technolo-
gies.  The assertion of state jurisdiction as hierarchically superior to 
technology provides an important incentive for technologists to create 
more refined technologies that allow communities to define their own 
rules.  For example, content filtering technologies exist as a result of 
pressure from the U.S. Congress,94  and the widely used e-commerce 
product, .NET Passport, was structured more carefully to enable com-
pliance with European data privacy rules only after European regula-
tors persuaded Microsoft to modify the product design.95  To the ex-
 
90 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2000). 
91 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1) (2000). 
92 Loi no. 2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 pour la confiance dans l’economie numeri-
que, J.O., 22 juin 2004, p. 11168, A.L.D., July 1, 2004, 1868, available at 
http://lexinter.net/lois4/loi_du_21_juin_2004_pour_la_confiance_dans_l’economie_
numerique.htm. 
93 See Gesetz über den Datenschutz bei Telediensten (Teledienstedatenschutzge-
setz—TDDSG), v. 22.7.1997 (BGB1. I S.1870), § 3(5) (requiring that teleservices users 
be informed about the nature and use of any personal data collected).  This was en-
acted as Article 2 of Gesetz zur Regelung der Rahmenbedingungen für Informations-
und Kommunikationsdienste (Informations-und Kommunikationsdienste-Gesetz—
IuKDG), v. 22.7.1997 (BGB1. I S.1870).  An English translation of the statute is avail-
able at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/TDDSG.htm. For a more detailed ex-
amination of section 3(5), see REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 36, at 71-72. 
94 See, e.g., Paul Resnick & Jim Miller, The CDA’s Silver Lining, WIRED, Aug. 1996, at 
109, 109 (noting that “[t]he original goal [of PICS filtering technology] was to em-
power parents and teachers to provide kid-safe lenses.  As a bonus, however, PICS pro-
vides a general labeling infrastructure that is now available for all kinds of uses.”), 
available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.08/silver_pr.html. 
95 See ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY,  WORKING DOCUMENT ON 
ON-LINE AUTHENTICATION SERVICES, at 4, E.U. DOC. 10054/03/EN WP 68 (Jan. 29, 
2003) (“As a result of this very open and fruitful dialogue Microsoft has committed it-
self to make changes to the system delivering improvements from the data protection 
perspective.”), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy 
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tent that granular technologies increase geolocation features and 
combine them with blocking capabilities, such technologies will en-
hance respect for sovereign states by empowering compliance with the 
rule of law in those states.  In other words, these technologies enable 
Internet participants to respect the legal obligations in states where 
their Internet activities reach rather than prevent compliance with lo-
cal law.  As a corollary, the assertion of jurisdiction by states over 
Internet participants provides a powerful incentive for innovation in 
technical capabilities in precisely the manner that strengthens the au-
thority of law in the face of technological attacks.  This approach cre-
ates new markets for technologically-based compliance services and 
products. 
In contrast, if the law accepts technological attacks, then there is 
little incentive for technical developers to innovate in ways that sup-
port public values.  Two recent cases illustrate this problem of tech-
nologically dependent decision making.  In Reno v. ACLU, Justice 
O’Connor noted that if technology were available that could offer less 
restrictive means to block access to minors, then the constitutional ob-
jections to the Communications Decency Act (CDA) might be more 
easily resolved.96  Justice O’Connor assumes that the court’s decision 
will have a neutral effect on technical developments and ignores 
whether the decision will undermine the incentives to develop tech-
nologies that might better protect children. 
More recently, in the Center for Democracy & Technology v. Pappert,97 
a federal district court faced a constitutional challenge to the Pennsyl-
vania statute that required web filtering to block children’s access to 
pornography.  The court took the same position: 
[T]he Court concludes that, with the current state of technology, the Act 
cannot be implemented without excessive blocking of innocent speech 
in violation of the First Amendment. . . . [G]iven the current design of 
the Internet, the Act is unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce 
Clause because of its affect[sic] on interstate commerce.
98
 
 
/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp68_en.pdf. 
96 521 U.S. 844, 891-92 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Although the pros-
pects for the eventual zoning of the Internet appear promising, I agree with the Court 
that we must evaluate the constitutionality of the CDA as it applies to the Internet as it 
exists today.”). 
97 337 F. Supp. 2d 606 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
98 Id. at 611. 
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Again, the federal court allowed the technological attack instead of 
requiring that the technology support a public policy of protecting 
children from pornography. 
Both courts assumed that technologies were static or, at least, that 
technological developments were outside the law.  This assumption is 
wrong.  Technology is dynamic and reacts to legal jurisdictional 
claims.  Had the courts imposed responsibility on Internet service 
providers, those providers would have had a strong incentive to rap-
idly develop technologies that would allow more refined filtering for 
users’ geographic reach and content selection.  Such developments 
would support important public values as defined by state legislatures.  
The opposite occurs when states do not insist on respect for their pub-
lic values.  Technologies attack state jurisdiction and there is little in-
centive to build in capabilities that can comply with state laws. 
 
*      *      * 
 
In summary, the assertion of sovereign jurisdiction to protect citi-
zens is likely to advance the fundamental public policy that the rule of 
law should be supreme to technological determinism.  At the same 
time, the multiplicity of states with jurisdiction over Internet activities 
is likely to stimulate creativity and new Internet services such as more 
accurate and selective filtering technologies, stronger security zones 
and more robust, customized compliance capabilities. 
